Stimulating Revolt in the Iranian Crazy State

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For weeks, debate over the Iran-Israel Twelve-Day War has revolved around enrichment capabilities, damage assessment, and the Trump-Netanyahu relationship. Rarely does anyone pause to mention just how crazy it is that the Islamic Republic of Iran exists almost exclusively to destroy Israel and the United States. As long as the current crazy government controls Iran, neither Israel, the "Little Satan," nor the U.S., the "Big Satan," is safe.

In 1971, Israeli political scientist Yehezkel Dror coined the term "crazy states" to identify ideologically-aggressive nations in pursuit of irrational or counter-rational goals. Dror believed a "crazy martyr state" that was "not bound by the taboos surrounding a doomsday machine" was the most dangerous and misunderstood problem the world faced 25 years into the Cold War. Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran is that crazy state.

In addition to popular, colloquial conceptions of "crazy," Dror's definition focuses on national goals, risk propensity, and style. Crazy states have aberrant or "counterreasonable goals," he argues. They expend an enormous percentage of their economic output attempting to control, convert, or absorb other states, even resorting to genocide. Risk tolerance is very high in crazy states, including a "readiness to sacrifice self-existence to achieve external goals." Crazy state style is characterized by "extreme deviation" from norms, including sabotage of peaceful civilian activities, extensive killing of diplomats, and terrorism directed against schools, hospitals, and recreation areas.

Dror's book evaluates many different countries but doesn't even mention Iran. Were he to revise his book today, the 97-year-old emeritus professor at Hebrew University, Jerusalem would probably include Iran in every chapter.

Dror points out 18 fallacies that rational states must avoid when dealing with crazy states. Number 17 concerns "the historic incorrectness of the view that agreements are usually kept." Crazy states rarely adhere to the agreements they sign.

Rational states must also beware of "the convex mirror effect" – our tendency to regard other nations as miniature versions of ourselves: "the assumption that every country wants for itself what the United States wants is a most insidious fallacy."

Finally, Dror warns that "a crazy state can behave rationally in the instrumental sense, that is, it can pick instruments which are highly effective for achievement of its (crazy) goals."

Rational states might desire nuclear weapons to deter attacks, but Iran has been forthright about its desire to use nuclear weapons against Israel and the U.S. However, its pursuit of nuclear weapons is also "instrumentally rational." Khamenei saw the fate of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi following his forfeiture of Libya's nuclear weapons program.

Many in the Trump administration, likely the president himself, would prefer to make a deal with Iran rather than defeating it. But making a deal means trusting Iran, and trusting a crazy state to adhere to any agreement is itself a kind of craziness.

Given limited options, and having failed to "restrain, control, and monitor" the crazy state, Dror believes the best option is any "substrategy designed to incapacitate a crazy state."

He lists invasion and occupation as viable options, but given our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. participation in an invasion and occupation of Iran is out of the question. Only the rational Iranian people can overthrow the crazy Islamic Republic.

But the U.S. can help without putting boots on the ground. Dror advocates policies that "stimulate revolt." The more people perceive their oppressive crazy leaders as weak and vulnerable, the more likely they will revolt.

Any effort to deprecate Khamenei and showcase the weakness of his regime could embolden rational Iranian people to take back their country from crazy people who have been running it since 1979.

Fortunately, Donald Trump is very good at deriding his enemies.

He seemed to be on this track on Friday when he unloaded in a Truth Social post after Khamenei boasted that Iran won the Twelve-Day War. "You got beat to hell," the president wrote.

On Saturday, he ramped up the rhetoric, sarcastically pointing out that as "a great man of faith" Khamenei "is not supposed to lie."

If the president can harness his personal animosity into a strategy that diminishes Khamenei in the eyes of all Iranians, including the generals and the police, it will be an awesome weapon.

He should press on, give in to his instincts, and ridicule Khamenei as only he can.

I suggest giving the Ayatollah a nickname.

Berating the Supreme Leader who went into hiding by calling him "The Hidden Imam" is likely to play well with the Iranian people.

And just think how much fun it would be to watch Donald Trump taunt Ali Khamenei as "The Supreme Loooooser."

Chief IPT Political Correspondent A.J. Caschetta is a principal lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology and a fellow at Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum where he is also a Milstein fellow.

Copyright © 2025. Investigative Project on Terrorism. All rights reserved.

Related Topics: A.J. Caschetta, Iran, Khamenei, Donald Trump, Big Satan, Little Satan, Yhezkel Dror

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